A History of Marginalization

Prior to 1917, Darfur was an independent sultanate for more than three centuries. As an affluent trade center, Darfur had economic ties which reached as far as the Mediterranean basin. The region, about the size of Texas, currently hosts multiple ethnic and tribal groups who have coexisted for hundreds of years. Each of these groups lives either a primarily pastoral or agricultural lifestyle in order to cope with the challenges of desert life.

Darfur was integrated into the territory of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan by the British in 1917, shifting political power to a small number of elites along the Nile River in Khartoum. Since annexation, Darfur as a region has been marginalized, a status that continues to this day. The region is often ignored in the national political debate, receives paltry economic and development assistance and lacks large-scale infrastructure. This underdevelopment, combined with the increasing regional desertification and encroachment of the Sahara has left both agriculturalists and pastoralists with limited economic opportunities, competing with each other for land and water in an increasingly fragile and hostile environment.

Stepping Stones to Conflict

As competition for economic resources began to polarize different ethnic groups, local politics intensified. Nomads, militias and arms from Chad and Libya began to stream in to the region to boost the support and power of Darfurian Arab leaders. Traditional reconciliation measures were no longer able to settle disputes over crops and grazing land, causing the region to became increasingly politicized and militarized. The complexities of desertification, famines, and the civil war raging between North and South Sudan contributed to a rise in regional tensions during the 1980s.

As the civil war between the North and the South reached its peak in the 1990’s, the government ignored reports of rising tensions and incidents of violence in Darfur. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement ended the North-South War in 2003, granting additional political power to South Sudan, it failed to take into account the effects of the war on Darfur. Additionally, due to the effects of the longest civil war in Africa, Darfur remained underdeveloped and marginalized at the federal level. These feelings of neglect, combined with allegations that the government was arming Arab tribesmen to raid non-Arab villages, was cited as the justification for a February 2003 rebel attack on a Sudanese Air Force Base at El Fasher, North Darfur. This attack sparked a series of government reprisals on residents of Darfur, contributing to what is considered the largest incidence of crimes against humanity of the twenty-first century.

Dynamics of the Ongoing Genocide

In response to the rebel movements, the government launched a counter-insurgency campaign, escalating into a scorched earth policy. This campaign’s central strategy was the hiring, training, and arming of Arab militias, historic rivals of the rebellious groups, who primarily belong to the Fur, Zaghawa, or Masalit ethnic groups. These militias came to be known as the Janjaweed, loosely translated as the “devil on horseback.” Janjaweed raiders engage in mass terror of non-Arab villages, murdering and displacing non-combatants, looting and burning food stocks, and enslaving and raping women and children. This land campaign is accompanied by Sudanese Air Force bombardment of rebel villages, providing air support for mounted Janjaweed attacks on non-combatant civilians.

This conflict is often characterized as a clash between Arab and non-Arab ethnicities residing in Darfur. However, the distinctions between perpetrators and victims are oversimplified through this illustration. The conflict is rooted in the manipulation of latent and overt ethnic tensions by both the Sudanese government and rebel movements in order to polarize the residents of Darfur. These tensions contribute to a web of shifting alliances between the government in Khartoum, Arab and non-Arab tribes and rebel groups.

The Sudanese government appears to be using the chaos to enforce dominance over rebellious groups in order to increase federal control over Darfur. Due to rising factionalism among rebel groups, any tangible resolution to this conflict is delayed, despite numerous peace talks.

Failed Peace Processes

Multiple negotiations have thus far been largely unsuccessful. The most successful talks thus far took place in Abuja in 2005–2006, leading to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). Present at these negotiations were the Sudanese government and three main rebel groups: the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) the Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur's faction of the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and Minni Minawi's faction of the SLM.

As negotiations stalled, Abdel Wahid and the JEM left the talks. Afterwards, AU mediators accepted Minni Minawi as the principal negotiator. Even though the parties issued the DPA, the majority of rebels have yet to ratify it. Due to this lack of popular support, most of its key provisions have yet to be implemented.

Since the Abuja conference, the major rebel groups have splintered, complicating the political situation by making it difficult to agree on a common negotiating position vis-à-vis the government of Sudan.

In October 2007, UN and AU mediators convened a peace conference in Libya. Present at the conference alongside the government and rebel officials, were regional leaders and Darfurian civil society groups. Unfortunately, a number of rebels, including Abdel Wahid Mohammed al-Nur boycotted the talks, essentially delegitimizing the position of the attending rebel groups. This boycott, combined with the continuing lack of a common rebel platform eliminated the possibility of an agreement acceptable to all conflict parties.

Current Situation on the Ground and UNAMID

In the last few months of 2007 and first part of 2008, the situation on the ground has begun to worsen. The regional lull in violence from late 2006 to early 2007 ended. Direct, violent clashes between the government and rebel groups have led to additional atrocities against civilians. Recently, Human Rights Watch issued a report detailing the extent of sexual violence against women and girls by government militias and rebels alike. In one camp over a five week period last August, 200 women reported instances of sexual assault.

The government resumed aerial bombardments of villages, attacks against humanitarian workers and international peacekeepers. In one set of attacks in January of this year, the Sudanese armed forces killed 115 civilians and displaced thousands more from the area around Jebel Moon. Recent violence surrounding the Sudanese federal census has caused additional displacement and death among the civilian population.

Since the beginning of last year, more than 250,000 residents have been displaced. Additionally, IDPs from multiple camps have been forcibly relocated. Given the fragile situation of the more than 2.5 million displaced people in the region, protection of the civilians continues to be a priority. This situation is exacerbated by the looming cuts in aid rations due to increasing security risks surrounding humanitarian deliveries. Since January, there have been two fatal attacks on World Food Program drivers, the result of over sixty hijackings of aid deliveries.

Early this year, the hybrid UN-AU mission in Darfur (UNAMID) assumed the role of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) mission. UNAMID was slated to replace the 7,000 AMIS troops with 26,000 UN peacekeepers authorized to use force to protect civilians. Despite this robust mandate, only slightly more than 9,000 UNAMID troops are deployed in Darfur, without the necessary logistical and transportation equipment to carry out the full mandate. In order to effectively protect civilians, UNAMID needs to be brought to full strength and assist in the creation of a peaceful and stable Darfur.

The continuing violence in Darfur has caused the International Criminal Court to step up its campaign to arrest and try former Sudanese State Minister of the Interior Ahmad Harun and "Janjaweed" leader Ali Kushayb for crimes against humanity. Sudan is currently refusing to cooperate, calling the ICC indictments political blackmail.

In early May, rebels from the Justice and Equality Movement attempted to attack Sudanese troops in Khartoum. This is the first assault on the capital in the five years of conflict in Darfur and led to a crackdown on Darfuris living in Khartoum, including summary arrests and allegations of torture.

In late July, ICC chief prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo submitted a request for an arrest warrant to a three-judge panel in The Hague, charging Sudanese President Omar Bashir with crimes against humanity and genocide. Bashir is the first sitting head of state to be charged by the ICC. The judges are expected to issue their ruling this fall.

While Sudan attempts to gain international support for a suspension of ICC proceedings against President Bashir, it continues its offensive against rebel groups and civilians in Darfur. On August 25, Sudanese police attacked the Kalma IDP camp in South Darfur, killing 31 civilians. Bombings and raids by Janjaweed militias in West Darfur and North Darfur continue the violence that has characterized the Darfur conflict since its beginning.